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vPreface
The Gavin Mooney Memorial Essay Competition honours the work and memory of the late Professor Gavin Mooney, a health economist who was a tireless advocate for social jus-
tice in local, national and international arenas. 
Each year the competition will call for entries related to a 
theme around equity and social justice. 
Launched in 2013, the competition seeks to draw public 
attention to social justice and health equity concerns, and to rec-
ognise the public-interest value of writing and writers.
The inaugural competition called for essays on the theme of 
climate change and equity, in recognition of the work of Profes-
sor Mooney’s late partner Dr Delys Weston. The judges sought 
works that:
• are disruptive – challenging or prompting change in the 
status quo
• incorporate novel ideas or approaches or thinking or style
• tell stories that matter
• are well-written.
Sydney GP Dr Tim Senior took out the inaugural 2013 prize 
with his essay “Climate Change and Equity: Whose Language Is 
It Anyway?”. The judges said the winning entry challenges the 
language of climate change activism, and also incorporates the 
voices of those who are most likely to be affected by climate 
change.
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The four runner-up entries are by Steve Campbell and Lucie 
Rychetnik, Oscar McLaren, Peter Boyer and Dora Marinova, and 
Fergus Green.
In addition to publication in this collection, the winner and 
four  runners-up will be published at Inside Story, inside.org.au.
The competition is a joint project of the Sydney School of 
Public Health at the University of Sydney, the public health blog 
Croakey, and Inside Story, an online current affairs publication 
from the Swinburne Institute for Social Research.
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Climate change and equity: 
whose language is it anyway?
Tim Senior
“I don’t believe in that climate change.” I’d just got back from Darwin in early October. I and many of my GP colleagues had been closely following the news of the bushfires in New 
South Wales. We’d had our first warning of high fire danger in late 
September. As I returned to work in Campbelltown, in southwest 
Sydney, a grey haze of smoke hung in the air. Each breath I took 
left a metallic reminder of the bushfires at the back of my throat. 
My patients were coughing more than usual. Those with 
asthma were getting through more inhalers. On behalf of 
patients, I’d been writing letters to the Department of Housing 
asking for modifications to keep people healthy, and even safe, 
in the weather extremes they were experiencing. It was what had 
been predicted. It was what was happening. So I was surprised to 
hear my patient say this.
“Oh,” I said. “I definitely do.” We’ve known each other a while, 
and I know her daughter, granddaughter and great grandson well 
too. We’d gone through quite a lot of medicine together, revealed 
enigmatically in small episodes like a slow-moving TV drama. 
This could become another storyline.
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As I asked a bit more, and we discussed it for a short time, 
I realised that it wasn’t that she didn’t believe in climate change, 
it was that change in climate as we tend to hear about it wasn’t a 
thing she experienced. Bushfire smoke and unseasonable weather 
definitely were. And they did affect her in numerous ways.
If I said I was going to write about climate change now, you’d 
expect me to write about carbon dioxide and other greenhouse 
gases; of concentrations in parts per million. We might mention 
farting cows, and have a little chuckle before getting back to the 
serious business of the perils of allowing average temperature to 
rise more than 2°C. We’d talk about sea-level rises and debate 
whether these would be measured in centimetres or metres. We 
would talk about glaciers and Greenland, polar bears and par-
asites. And my essay could be confined to the environmental 
(green-coloured) pages of the newspaper, where it can do no 
harm to the parallel worlds of business or politics.
My patient’s experience is very different. She’s experiencing 
the smell of the air, and her lungs are bringing back up the fine 
particles of smoke blown across from the Blue Mountains. Her 
skin feels the change in temperature of 10°C from one day to the 
next, and the pain in her joints tells her this is an unpleasant and 
undesirable phenomenon. Her jangling nerves still remind her 
that she slipped on her steps at a time of heavy rainfall, suffering 
a nasty fracture of her arm.
Perhaps it’s not that she doesn’t believe in climate change. 
She’s suffered the effects of it more than I have. Perhaps it’s that 
there are no polar bears to be worried about in Campbelltown. 
There are no glaciers, shrinking or otherwise, in Queen Street. 
Almost no one ever experiences the actual average global tem-
perature. The way climate change is talked about just has no bear-
ing on her life.
If I am honest, it doesn’t on mine either. To a lesser degree, 
I experience some inconveniences. My trains are delayed because 
of bushfires and I’ve had roads near me blocked by floods, both 
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of which have prevented me from making it to work. I observe 
changes in the timing of blossom coming out in our garden. 
I  choose to link this to climate change, though, and I choose 
to worry about it on behalf of my children and their children 
to come. I am in a privileged position, being paid above aver-
age, having a house in working order, and having no concerns 
about where my next meal is coming from. What else do I have 
to worry about, apart from climate change? Contrast this with my 
patient. She has some very real fears about affording the cooling 
at home, and worries about her granddaughter’s health problems 
after getting out of a violent relationship. This doesn’t leave much 
room to worry about polar bears and ice sheets. The irony here 
is that those, like my patients, who will be most affected by the 
changes in the climate, those least able to adapt, are those who 
are already struggling and therefore not worrying much about 
climate change as we conventionally talk about it.
Some words on climate change
What’s going on here? Those of us who talk, write and campaign 
about climate change are often dismissed as being out-of-touch, 
latte-sipping, inner-city types. After all, the inner city is where 
the Greens have most of their support. In his book The Lucky Cul-
ture, journalist Nick Cater describes this familiar bogeyman for 
the right wing – the university-educated, left-wing elite – talking 
to itself through the ABC. The stereotype is designed to dismiss 
these views and make them seem irrelevant, and to ensure that 
the political and economic changes needed to reduce the effects 
of climate change don’t find traction in the wider community. 
It’s easy to rebut the stereotype. I don’t drink lattes and don’t 
live in the inner city, but I am passionate about doing something 
about climate change. However, I wonder if there is a kernel of 
truth in this stereotype. The truth isn’t in the claim that there is a 
new left-wing ruling elite who think they are morally superior, as 
Cater claims. In fact, I’d suggest that the left are more riven with 
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self-doubt than the right, who may see themselves as the rightful 
rulers. The truth is in the language we use. You can almost guar-
antee that anyone talking about climate change in the terms I’ve 
described – sea-level rises, ice sheets, average temperature rises, 
greenhouse gases – is not in the groups who will suffer most of the 
effects, either now or in the future. Those affected now talk about 
bushfires. They talk about floods, hurricanes, drought, crop fail-
ure, increasingly salty water, rising food prices. “Ah, yes, you see,” 
we shout back. “Climate change. I told you so.” For those stuck in 
the middle of an environmental emergency, it’s not helpful.
This big-picture language distances us from those most 
affected. And it’s a pattern of behaviour. We see it in the way 
we talk about the so-called social determinants of health. I’ve 
never heard my patients talk about social determinants. I’ve 
never heard them mention the term “food security” either. But 
I’ve witnessed the tears after another racial bullying episode at 
work. I’ve heard people reluctantly admit that they’ve not eaten 
for a few days so the children can. I’ve seen stress that makes peo-
ple sick from constant arguments with the housing department 
about getting repairs for the draughts through the house. I can 
go home, though, and have a sip of chardonnay, debrief with my 
wife, perhaps write another article for Croakey about the social 
determinants of health. My patients, meanwhile, have no escape. 
No need for the words when you live inside it.
We can draw on some good research here, looking at the 
terminology of the social determinants of health. The Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation, which lobbies on health issues in the 
United States, published a paper on the subject in 2010, A New 
Way to Talk about Social Determinants of Health. As they say, 
those working with the problems on the ground “didn’t necessar-
ily resonate with this frame… We had to talk about the topic in a 
way that people could understand, that was meaningful, and that 
didn’t align the topic with any existing political  perspective or 
agenda.”1 The researchers discovered that the concepts contained 
11
CLIMATE CHANGE AND EQUITY: WHOSE LANGUAGE IS IT ANYWAY?
in the terminology of the social determinants of health were ones 
everyone could identify with, but not the terminology itself. If 
they used a phrase such as “Health starts in our families, in our 
schools and workplaces, in our playgrounds and parks, and in 
the air we breathe and the water we drink,” then there was broad 
agreement with these ideas. It is striking that anyone who uses 
the term “social determinants of health” is not likely to be some-
one who is at risk from them. Again, you have no need for these 
words if you have no escape from what they hold.
The Robert Woods Johnson Foundation also points to the 
deep metaphors held by people from different political perspec-
tives. Words such as “equity,” “fairness” and “justice” are not used 
by people who describe themselves as conservative. It may be that 
this is why people like Cater can dismiss campaigners on issues 
such as climate change and the social determinants of health as 
being of the left. They see such words scattered through the way 
campaigners talk, which just produces a gut reaction against 
those talking about climate change. It’s easy to see why those on 
the right of the political spectrum could view talk about climate 
change as a cover for producing a socialist paradise. It’s not that it 
actually is, it’s that the words we use are not the words they would 
use to describe a desirable world. 
The Robert Woods Johnson Foundation points out that those 
on the right politically prefer to use terms about referring to indi-
vidual responsibility and opportunity. Ironically, there’s a missed 
opportunity here. Surely the issue of climate change could be 
framed as the ultimate conservative cause, the very essence of the 
roots of the word “conservation.” Action against climate change 
should be the ultimate conservative policy, preserving the nat-
ural systems that our fundamental institutions have been built 
on. The systems of the market, of buying and selling, depend on 
stability and predictability. All the predictions about changes to 
the climate tell us that there will be more weather extremes, with 
consequent unpredictability about food supply and  transport 
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viability. More disasters will lead to a need for bigger government 
to co-ordinate rescues and rebuilding. It’s not a future a con-
servative would wish for. Perhaps we could frame some of the 
solutions as being about taking responsibility in our own areas of 
influence, about protecting these systems. Taking action on cli-
mate is an opportunity for entrepreneurs and small business, if 
governments enabled it.
Merely knowing about climate change
The problem goes deeper than just a use of language, though. Yes, 
the language used around climate change and equity distances 
it from the very people who would be affected most by what is 
happening. The cause of this disconnect is that we have come to 
believe that knowing about something is the same as knowing 
something. It’s a deep Western cultural belief of ours. It is not 
necessarily a bad thing, but it is a double-edged sword. 
Knowing about things has resulted in a huge increase in 
knowledge and a massive extension of what is knowable beyond 
our immediate experience. We know about distant stars and have 
identified some planets in other solar systems. We’ve discovered 
cellular mechanisms, with practical implications for making 
people better from diseases. We’ve come to understand sub-
atomic particles and the counterintuitive party tricks of quantum 
physics. But knowing about things has also led to a devaluing 
of personal, subjective knowledge, the lived experience, knowing 
things themselves. In one sense it’s another version of colonisa-
tion, where a particularly successful system of knowledge acqui-
sition dismisses other ways of knowing, and says they should all 
become more like it.
There are almost too many examples to choose from, but we 
don’t notice them because knowing about is so deeply embedded. 
Knowing about underpins the system of academic publishing – 
that you can write about something, someone can read it and they 
now know it. The whole education system is built on  knowing 
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about things. Education becomes about transmitting a set of facts. 
If you have a copy of the PowerPoint slides you know the lecture. 
It is only because we privilege knowing about that we can have 
lectures about Aboriginal cultures and think we know what that 
means. How else could it not matter who assesses learning objec-
tives related to cultural awareness? How could we possibly have 
Massive Open Online Courses, or Free Open Access Medical 
Education without equating knowing about with knowing?
Even parenting has become a thing to know about. If you 
read a parenting book or two, then you’ll know enough to be a 
parent. I’ve never met a parent yet, though, who says they under-
stood what it would be like before they actually had children.
The whole New Atheist movement is built on knowing facts 
about religion and finding them demonstrably false. Religion in 
reply – particularly fundamentalist religion – has tried to contest 
that these facts are in fact true. Both sides miss the point that, like 
so many human activities, religion is a practice, and experience, 
not a set of facts to be memorised.
But how could this be any different? Surely, this is the way 
things are now, and can’t be changed? Even now, though, there 
are times where knowing, as opposed to knowing about, is seen 
as a useful skill. I have listened as one of my (urban) Aboriginal 
patients describes the gentle outline of the hill he walked up and 
over to get to the practice. I’d never noticed it, until getting on 
my bike. Some Aboriginal people still follow the natural rhythms 
of the seasons. The fluctuations of animal migrations, and the 
rhythm of foliage, flowers and fruit are all signals to be read for 
those who know. I have had a tour of a local landscape from an 
Aboriginal elder, who shared detailed, experiential knowledge 
about how trees affect the growth of competitors, and detailed 
observations of the construction of an anthill and what this means 
about the weather to come. This isn’t described as knowledge, but 
as culture. I have heard elsewhere that the blooming of the wattle 
flowers indicates that it is time to fill out your tax return.
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Author Karen Armstrong points out that religion is a set of 
cultural rituals and practices, not a set of disputed facts to be 
believed. All cultures have rituals that you won’t really under-
stand unless you take part in them regularly. Only in Western 
culture, where knowing about is valued more than knowing 
could we jettison many of our communal rituals. I remember 
as a child at church in England celebrating harvest festival each 
year. As philosopher Alain de Botton points out, religions mark 
out time in significant human events like births, marriages and 
deaths, but also over the year. Our ability to transplant a northern 
hemisphere Christianity, and its three-year liturgical cycle, to the 
southern hemisphere is a huge triumph of knowing about over 
knowing, with the prize a celebration of the midwinter  Christmas 
festival in the hottest part of the year, complete with fake snow.
Think global, talk local, act everywhere
Those who aren’t convinced by the arguments in favour of taking 
action on climate change sometimes claim that belief in climate 
change has become like a religion. Even using the word “belief ” 
makes this point. 
The prophetic fervour about apocalyptic claims is worth 
commenting on, not because the claims are wrong, but because 
of the religious archetypes they unknowingly draw on. Like athe-
ists and fundamentalists, though, climate change campaigners 
have forgotten the central truth of religion. Facts don’t change 
people’s minds; stories do. Climate change campaigning, like 
religion, should not be a debate about the facts, though we pre-
tend it is. Here’s your evidence, though. If it were just about the 
facts, there would be no climate change scepticism. What religion 
used to do more successfully than any other system was change 
behaviour, through the ritual and ceremonial retelling and inter-
nalising of a series of founding stories. These weren’t just read 
– in fact when they were read, it was often in Latin, a language 
 incomprehensible to most listeners, just adding to the mystique. 
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The rituals involved participation, art, singing, acting out, ritual 
movements, silence and, ultimately, emotion.
Perhaps our talk about climate change can draw on this. We 
are more likely to bring people into action on climate catastrophe 
through engaging the emotions, with stories, than through sum-
maries of reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change. I’m not suggesting that facts be jettisoned, but it is what 
you do with them that matters. I’m also not suggesting that the 
solution is to fall down and worship Gaia either. It’s worth noting 
in passing that metaphors like James Lovelock’s Gaia theory do 
get some traction, not because of the science, but because they 
are stories that some people find attractive.
What I am suggesting, though, is that talk of climate change 
needs to move from the global and scientific knowing about to 
the local lived experience of changes on the ground. We might 
be able to learn again from the Robert Woods Johnson Founda-
tion here. As well as describing how the words traditionally used 
about the social determinants of health don’t connect with the 
people working on the ground, or the people who  experience 
their effects, the Foundation also describes alternatives. These 
alternatives connect with people’s intuitive understandings of 
the way their workplaces, their schools and their towns affect 
their health. 
We can see how different the discussion would be if we were 
to talk about climate change in these alternative ways, especially 
for those most affected. What are the concerns of people in this 
situation currently? How well-built is the house where you live? 
Will it keep you cool in really hot summers? Will it keep you 
warm in an extreme winter? Is it waterproof against those rain-
storms? Can you and all your family afford to eat three meals a 
day? What if food prices went up? What if your insurance goes 
up because of the increased risk of storms, floods and fires? How 
reliable is your public transport? Will that be affected by bushfires 
or bad weather? How does the temperature affect your health? 
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What about smoke from fires? How is your mood affected by 
unpredictable weather?
People across the political spectrum can be engaged by a call 
to personal responsibility. By walking more, taking public trans-
port, and planting and eating food locally, you save money, get 
healthier and make it less likely that we’ll get those extremes of 
weather. People can only take responsibility, though, if businesses 
and government give them the infrastructure to make choices. 
So quality public transport is required, as is land for community 
gardens and incentives for reducing emissions.
I don’t know that these suggestions are particularly good or 
imaginative, but they start to explore the possibilities. The Robert 
Woods Johnson Foundation also gives some good advice about 
using facts. Instead of using multiple facts pointing the same way, 
use one: “More facts made people feel like they were being sold 
or spun.” Use a few complementary facts, judiciously placed, and 
make them memorable. I suspect that the diminishing length of 
time between severe bushfires may be one of those, but that an 
average global temperature rise of 4°C is not.
The challenge, then, is to frame climate change problems in 
a way that relates to everyday experiences. Not just that, but we 
need to be able to show unequivocally that we care as much for 
those who will be most affected by climate change, those who are 
most vulnerable to its effects, as we do for polar bears. We need 
to demonstrate an awareness of the current challenges faced by 
those most vulnerable to climate change, because they are also 
the people who are already the most vulnerable to all the other 
social problems we create. In short, we need to understand that 
many of us who think this issue is important come from a posi-
tion of privilege, but that we stand alongside the most vulnerable, 
understand their current challenges and are working with them 
to prevent these getting worse.
Doing this, though, will need a few changes in our approach. 
It will need us to listen more. We will need to listen harder to 
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those who will be most affected by climate change. We will need 
to understand, to know, if possible, rather than just know about 
their concerns and their experiences. This understanding is 
unlikely to be couched in the academic or political language we 
are used to hearing, and is all the more valuable for that. It is also 
likely to go beyond climate impacts – to speak of political mar-
ginalisation, of cost-of-living pressures, of the effects of being a 
have-not in a world that glorifies the haves. 
This language can appeal to those across the political spec-
trum. It speaks of responsibility and opportunity as well as equity 
and justice. Then, we will need to allow those most affected to 
tell their stories to a broader audience. This sounds easy, but 
it is a trap we fall into all too easily, allowing the privileged to 
speak on behalf of the less privileged. We can see this at work, 
for  example, in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander affairs. This 
puts an added responsibility on us, though – to ensure the safety 
of those telling their stories, to stand with them and take heat on 
their behalf. We only have to note the recent example of what 
happens when we do something as radical as have a female prime 
minister to see the heat that generates. Witness also the class-
based insults thrown by the privileged from all sides of politics 
when someone like Rick Muir gets elected to the Senate. We can 
expect that when vulnerable people talk about what will happen 
to them, and what is already happening to them, as a result of 
climate change, their views will be discounted because of their 
vulnerability. The opportunity is huge – this is the chance to act 
out our commitment to hear the voices of marginalised and vul-
nerable communities, and to allow them a say in their future and 
control over their own lives.
I have argued that we need another way of talking about cli-
mate change, one that uses what we know from the science to 
speak to people’s lived experience. One that draws on story and 
art and music, different cultural views and ritual and ceremony. 
We need to use this opportunity to hear from those who will be 
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most affected, and to project their voices. We need to engage rea-
son and touch emotion. And we need to move the debate away 
from average temperatures, glaciers and polar bears, which can 
be kept on the environment pages, and instead discuss how to 
keep the economy operational, the trains running and the power 
on. We need to say that whatever it is you care about, whether it’s 
agriculture, schooling, defence or health, the changes we are see-
ing in our climate will have a profound impact. This is tradition-
ally a left-wing issue, but for those on the right, the institutions 
they believe in will be profoundly affected too, and this doesn’t 
depend on “belief ” in the science.
Now if a patient tells me, “I don’t believe in that climate 
change,” I can shrug, and ask what she values. The science is 
established. Her health depends on smoke-free air, clean water, 
available and affordable fresh fruit and vegetables, and shelter 
against the elements that is capable of withstanding whatever the 
weather can throw at it. Her health also depends on those around 
her having the same – we don’t need trips to hospitals or funerals 
for friends and family. But the point is that my health depends 
on these things too, and so, whoever you are reading this, does 
yours. We are all living in a shared life-support system. If we want 
to continue living healthy lives, it’s time we stopped trashing it. 
We need a language we can all understand, and we need to hear 
from those who are first in the queue to be harmed.
Author
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Endnote
1. Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, A New Way to Talk about Social 
Determinants of Health, 1 January 2010, accessed at http://www.rwjf.org/
content/dam/farm/reports/reports/2010/rwjf63023.

21
CHAPTER 2
Reframing equity for action on 
climate change 
Steve Campbell and Lucie Rychetnik
Imagine you are a Tuvaluan with a home where your ancestors have lived for thousands of years. You embody a great depth of culture and connection to a small green-and-white disc in an 
enormous expanse of blue. Your past and future are inherently 
linked to this coral atoll. 
The threat that you face from climate change is the potential 
that your sovereign nation will disappear in the next fifty years 
because of the combined effects of rising sea levels and more 
intense storm surges. These changes will affect your language, 
your culture and your very ability to survive. 
Now consider the similar scenarios of loss and relocation in 
other parts of the world, such as the Maldives, Bangladesh, Alaska 
and the Yangtze delta. Entire communities and even nations have 
been displaced and lost as a result of climate change, which they 
hardly contributed to and have almost no power to stop. 
On the coastline of Australia and other wealthy nations, 
beachside properties – also at risk – sparkle in the sun. But a major 
difference between the Tuvaluan already contemplating the death 
of her nation and wealthy Westerners living on  coastlines around 
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the world is our capacity for effective intervention – both to limit 
climate change and to moderate the impacts on our own lives and 
communities. If the wealthy majority have great incentives and 
abundant means to act, then why have they not done so?
The responsibilities and pain of climate change fall unequally. 
For many of us the value of equity is important and deeply felt 
– providing sufficient rationale to support action on climate 
change. Indeed arguments based on equity and justice have been 
a cornerstone of the climate debate for many decades. The fact 
that “climate change and equity” is the topic for the inaugural 
2013 Gavin Mooney memorial essay is fortuitous and timely. It 
provides an opportunity to examine one of the most significant 
challenges facing humanity.
The inequities of climate change are real and stark – in terms 
of who is most responsible and on whom it has most impact. Yet 
our traditional equity arguments have so far failed: they have 
proven too narrow to mobilise the mainstream, and  haven’t 
challenged those who benefit most from blocking an effective 
response to climate change. Concerns about equity and climate 
change are perceived as primarily aligned with the progressive 
left of politics. We propose a reframing of equity in the climate 
change debate to embrace the middle ground. This repositioning 
articulates an emerging shift in the “us” and “them” of responsi-
bility and impact, to recognise that the majority of us are on the 
same side, and realigns the balance of power to better support 
national and international action. 
Effective action on climate change is now overdue
On 27 September 2013 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, or IPCC, delivered the first part of its Fifth  Assessment 
Report. Thousands of world-leading scientists contribute to 
the IPCC to produce conservative consensus reports, which 
confirm that climate change is real and unequivocal.1 There is 
also  scientific consensus that the enormous disruptions to the 
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equilibrium of our atmosphere, global warming, and changing 
weather  patterns are largely the result of rising atmospheric car-
bon dioxide caused by burning fossil fuels such as coal and oil, 
and by global deforestation: a causal relationship demonstrated 
with as much certainty as that of smoking causing lung cancer. 
Importantly, the world’s leading scientists and the world’s gov-
ernments have agreed that we must stay below a 2°C rise in global 
mean temperature to prevent the impact of climate change from 
becoming catastrophic.2 
Yet carbon dioxide emissions continue to rise and on cur-
rent projections we are likely to go above a 2°C rise within this 
century.3 Before the industrial revolution, the mean atmospheric 
concentration of carbon dioxide was 280 parts per million, or 
ppm. In 2013 the concentration of carbon dioxide rose for the 
first time above 400 ppm.4 We have entered the Anthropocene 
– a new geological epoch distinct from all others, defined by the 
impact of humanity on nature. Humanity is re-engineering the 
physics of the planet in radical ways by changing the chemical 
content of the atmosphere and reconstructing natural systems 
such as the Southern Oscillation Index (El Niño/La Niña) and 
the Atlantic Gulf Stream. We have also caused climate feedback 
loops, such as the melting of Arctic sea ice, which results in less 
reflection of solar energy and more absorption of heat into the 
ocean; and the thawing of northern tundra, which causes the 
release of methane, a potent greenhouse gas. For the communi-
ties already displaced by rising sea levels and destroyed by more 
severe and frequent hurricanes and storms, climate change is 
already catastrophic. 
In other parts of the world, food and water security are grow-
ing concerns. Climate change has had an impact on farming com-
munities in Africa, Southeast Asia and China.5 It has contributed 
to conflicts in Sudan, Somalia and Syria, where wars are inten-
sified by climate change.6 In Australia, already one of the driest 
countries on the planet, rainfall patterns in critical  agricultural 
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lands are also changing and we have witnessed the increasing 
intensity of bushfires. 
As consumers of fossil fuels, and recipients of the blowbacks 
of the physical world, we are essentially committing violence on 
ourselves. But judging by the current political responses in many 
countries – and right now, particularly in Australia – the magni-
tude and extent of the damage, and damage yet to come, have not 
yet been fully comprehended.
So what of equity?
For over two centuries, the burning of fossil fuels has stimulated 
economic growth, lifted billions of people out of poverty, extended 
life expectancy, and developed the extraordinary comforts of the 
Western lifestyle. We also know, however, that beyond a modest 
point of consumption a carbon-intensive lifestyle doesn’t make 
people healthier, or likely happier. Indeed, as researchers Richard 
Wilkinson and Kate Pickett have shown, there are no observable 
additional benefits to life expectancy once fossil fuel consump-
tion rises above four tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions per cap-
ita per year.7 
In Australia we emit around nineteen tonnes of carbon diox-
ide per capita per year. Our emissions are almost double the 
OECD average, four times that of China, and twenty times that 
of India.8 The consumption of fossil fuels by the richest countries 
has disproportionately affected the poorest economies9 and had 
the most negative health impacts on the poorest populations.10 
Our higher-than-average carbon dioxide emissions and signifi-
cant fossil fuel exports are partly responsible for the harsh and 
escalating impacts of climate change on the poorest and most 
 disadvantaged peoples, who mostly live in countries with the 
lowest carbon dioxide emissions. High levels of fossil fuel con-
sumption also generate extraordinary profits for the rich and 
super rich – especially for the billionaire owners of coal and oil 
companies.
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Equity is about social justice. The term “inequity” is often 
used to refer to unfair differences of access or opportunity in the 
economic, political and social realms – differences that can be 
recalibrated and remedied. Concerns about equity also relate to 
morality or ethics – that is, doing the “right” thing by others. In 
the political sphere, it is acceptable to talk about equity in terms of 
a fair and equal opportunity to participate in society and thrive. 
Few on the centre-left or centre-right of politics disagree with 
such sentiments; the distinctions are most likely to be about how 
we pursue such goals, including whether the emphasis is on com-
munal or individual paths. Thus, although there is much variety 
in how the notion of equity is interpreted and applied, a good 
or civil society is often described as one that achieves fairness in 
people’s access to security, education, health and wellbeing. 
But equity also relies on the distribution of economic and 
political power – power that is used to create injustice as much 
as it can be used to rebalance the scales – and this intrinsically 
takes the commitment to equity towards the left of politics. 
Herein lies what has proven to be one of the greatest challenges 
for the climate movement, whose antecedents and strongest allies 
have come from both the traditional and the progressive left. Left 
politics have guided the principles and values that underpinned 
environmental activism in the past, and informed the solutions 
that have been pursued. As has been increasingly recognised, a 
perceived alignment between concerns about climate change and 
progressive left politics has resulted in limited engagement of the 
political right.11 It has also enabled those defending and promot-
ing the interests of the fossil fuel industry to play wedge politics 
on climate change to keep it out of the mainstream.
The traditional “equity frame” for addressing climate change 
is one that challenges developed nations, which protect their 
current high levels of fossil fuel consumption at the expense of 
those least responsible but most affected by rising global tem-
peratures and adverse weather events. Indeed the principles of 
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equity as outlined in the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change, or UNFCCC, suggest that the most 
 developed nations have the greatest responsibility to decarbonise 
– and should do so more rapidly than those whose economies are 
still developing. This is because developed nations are primarily 
responsible for the cumulative historical carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere, and have the greatest capacity to carry the burden of 
remediation. Thus the UNFCCC secretariat has tried to negoti-
ate country-specific emission reduction targets (or exemptions) 
based on historical emissions and future need for emissions to 
support economic growth.
The same principles of equity can also be applied to distri-
bution of the global “carbon budget.” This refers to the maxi-
mum remaining carbon dioxide that could still be released into 
the atmosphere before the world reaches the critical and cata-
strophic 2°C rise in mean global temperature. It is now known 
that the remaining global carbon budget is 565 gigatonnes of 
carbon dioxide emissions.12 This adds important information to 
future negotiations, as they must account for not only the equity 
of emission targets (or exemptions) but also the finite size of the 
carbon budget that can be safely allocated.
Critically, however, and irrespective of what allocations 
of carbon dioxide emissions may be deemed fair and equita-
ble, intergovernmental negotiations do not address the power-
ful market forces that work outside the scope of such potential 
agreements. The global fossil fuel industry has existing reserves 
of coal, oil and gas that are known to contain 2795 gigatonnes of 
carbon dioxide – almost five times the maximum amount that it 
is “safe” to burn.13 And the main energy corporations continue to 
search for more reserves, with explorations expanding into new 
territories such as the Arctic and the Canadian tar sands. These 
current and predicted fossil fuel reserves contribute to the bal-
ance sheets of major energy companies and buoy up their share 
prices – corporations like Chevron, ExxonMobil, Saudi Aramco, 
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BP, Shell, Sinopec, PetroChina and Total, all in the top twelve 
companies of the world by revenue.14 The primary objective of 
such companies is to maximise the demand for and consumption 
of fossil fuel.
This essay does not seek to challenge the capitalist system. 
There are thousands of other major companies in the world 
whose businesses do not contribute to or perpetuate catastrophic 
climate change. Indeed harnessing the market to build an alter-
native sustainable energy industry will be the only way that the 
world will meet its energy needs and survive. But the most sig-
nificant and urgent inequity of climate change today is how the 
greatest financial power and political influence currently lies with 
a specific industry that is totally out of step with the limits of 
nature and global collective interests.
International negotiations and national politics have mostly failed 
There are new ways to meet our needs, to lift people out of poverty 
and limit climate change, but the path to a brighter future is being 
blocked by the past, by the vested and invested coal and oil barons.
– Kumi Naidoo and Bill McKibben, 201315
The UNFCCC has been meeting since 1992. The 1997 Kyoto Pro-
tocol led some countries to commit to binding emissions reduction 
targets, most importantly in the European Union. Yet countries 
such as Australia negotiated increased emissions, and the United 
States (the world’s highest emitter at the time, and still the worst 
historically) did not commit to anything. Other major emitters 
of carbon dioxide, such as China, India and Brazil, were exempt 
– arguing that to lift their populations out of poverty, their 
own development must remain carbon-intensive. At the Bali 
UNFCCC conference in 2007 most countries agreed to a “road 
map to an agreement” for emissions reductions for developed 
countries in a range between 10 per cent and 40 per cent by 2020. 
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But subsequent negotiations collapsed in Copenhagen in 2009, 
and little has been achieved since, including in Warsaw in 2013.
These international negotiations have been hindered by 
country delegations focused on short-term national interests 
and local domestic politics, which are mostly unsympathetic 
to the urgency of climate change and to sharing the burden of 
remediation in the name of equity. But this often-intransigent 
self-interest is further confounded and often manipulated by 
the strategic interference of powerful lobby groups representing 
the interests of the oil, coal and gas industries. The owners and 
CEOs of the world’s largest fossil fuel companies have systemati-
cally and effectively directed their financial power to disrupt and 
control international negotiations and to minimise agreement. 
They employ public relations agencies like Hill + Knowlton or 
Burson-Marsteller to create and perpetuate doubt in the minds 
of the public about the science of climate change, clearly repeat-
ing the strategies of the tobacco industry in previous decades.16 
They send large numbers of lobbyists to the climate negotiations, 
often on country delegations. They fund think tanks that support 
climate change denial, such as the Institute of Public Affairs, and 
“astroturf ” questionable grassroots groups like the anti–wind 
power lobby.17 They have also developed significant influence 
over national politics and media. 
One of the greatest obstacles facing an effective response to 
climate change is the degree to which it has become so politi-
cised. Many factors have contributed to enabling vested inter-
ests to perpetuate the idea that climate change is only a far-left 
concern. This polarisation has been employed to keep climate 
change out of the mainstream and to ensure that citizens on 
the centre-left or centre-right of politics engage in a political 
tug of war over climate change, rather than uniting to demand 
real and effective government intervention. In the United States, 
the United Kingdom and Australia, for example, climate change 
has been embroiled in energy- and time-depleting culture wars, 
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which result in stagnation and inaction, and mask the potential 
for agreement about our common goals. These conflicts also 
serve to divert attention from the activities of the industries that 
are primarily responsible for the problem, and that have the most 
to lose if international action on climate were effective. 
Reframing equity for climate change action 
We support the moral and ethical arguments that wealthier 
nations should lead the way in reducing carbon dioxide emis-
sions, and assist poor and developing nations to ameliorate the 
effects of climate change. Yet the traditional equity frame hasn’t 
engaged sufficient numbers in the mainstream populations of 
developed countries; too many people either do not perceive 
themselves to be affected or resent being asked to feel responsible 
for the plight of others. Equity arguments easily invoke the con-
cepts of “us” and “them,” thus enabling the tactical and deliberate 
politicisation of climate change by the fossil fuel industries and 
their aligned politicians. 
So how can we, as the only species that has both an intense 
survival instinct and a deep sense of ethics, respond effectively to 
the looming climate catastrophe? How can we ensure that con-
cerns about climate change will resonate with enough people of 
various political persuasions to mobilise effective national and 
international action? And how can we do justice to the most vul-
nerable among us as well as to our future generations? Right now, 
we believe the answer is to do justice to ourselves.
The increasing focus within the climate change movement 
on the actions of the wealthiest fossil fuel companies18 leads us 
to reconsider and reorient our thinking about the inequities of 
climate change. This emerging perspective is less focused on the 
relationship between “us” as the peoples of the developed world 
and “them” as the peoples of the developing world. Rather it 
points to the relationship between “us” as the global majority of 
humanity affected by climate change and the new “them,” framed 
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as those actively advancing climate change by owning, extracting, 
selling and investing in fossil fuels. This new equity frame high-
lights different kinds of disparities and raises alternative ethical 
and political arguments. For example:
• Fossil fuel companies are making astronomical profits; yet 
“they” receive massive tax breaks and subsidies by national 
governments at “our” expense. 
• “They” fund the pseudo-science and fake debates about the 
science of climate change that distract and hinder real polit-
ical negotiations on climate action.
• “Our” properties, families and communities are bearing 
the brunt of climate change arising from more frequent 
and destructive weather events such as intense storms and 
bushfires. 
• “Our” taxes pay for the clean up – funding the fire brigades, 
emergency services and the damage to shared infrastruc-
ture. “We” also pay for the rising costs of insurance.
The reframing of equity for climate change action identi-
fies more common ground between developed and developing 
nations, and between ordinary people on both sides of politics. 
The mainstream majority in all nations is being manipulated and 
exploited by a minority of extremely wealthy and influential indi-
viduals for the purpose of maximising their profits. In terms of 
public communication about climate change, this reframing can 
also be seen as a shift in focus from “the mainstream versus the 
far left” to “the mainstream versus the far right.”
Traditional equity debates about climate change have tended 
to focus on redressing the impacts of climate change for the 
poorest and most disadvantaged. But within that frame, climate 
change is often perceived to be about “them” – that is, unknown 
peoples from other lands – while the majority perceive them-
selves to be unaffected. The new equity frame places the majority 
of “us” on the same side as the underprivileged – not only because 
the impacts will ultimately affect the majority, but also because 
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we are all being manipulated to do nothing by those on the far 
right. Under the new equity frame the allocation of responsi-
bility and the locus of the “problem” is located with the greatest 
power and wealth, where we will find those who own and run 
the largest of the world’s fossil fuel companies. The new equity 
frame names the perpetrators for who they are, and embraces the 
middle ground. It not only changes the conversation about equity 
in climate change, but most importantly it also changes the rules 
for climate action.
Emerging approaches for effective climate action 
The greatest drivers for action on climate change are likely to 
be based on our human commitment to self-preservation and 
survival. We need to harness the catalysing force of self-interest 
and engage the political mainstream to drive large-scale social 
change. We also need solutions that will appeal across the polit-
ical spectrum, while acknowledging that people will focus on 
those that most align with their values and cultural group. For 
some, the impact of climate change on the poorest nations will 
continue to drive their commitment to intervene. For others, 
action on climate change will primarily be about family (includ-
ing future generations of family) or their love and responsibil-
ity for local land. Whatever our drivers, there are actually many 
common goals and speaking with a broader frame is essential. 
And the strongest drivers and most effective solutions are likely 
to be economic. 
Currently, most major banks and superannuation funds hold 
large investments in fossil fuel companies. While this is a potential 
challenge, it also highlights how the market is a principal source 
of leverage and power. And as the financial risks associated with 
these investments become more widely recognised, divestment 
of fossil fuel holdings becomes an obvious and effective strategy 
for addressing climate change. Divestment can also bypass the 
politics of wasteful and vindictive culture wars, which detract 
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from the real issues, to instead foster a broader recognition of 
how the fragile reliance on fossil fuels is being manipulated by 
those who reap enormous benefits at our expense.
Encouragingly, new approaches to understanding and res-
ponding to climate change are gathering momentum, offering 
an expanded menu of emerging and predicted actions that are 
global, national, local and personal. For example: 
• The market will start to recognise “carbon risk” – that is, 
the long-term financial risks associated with investing in 
carbon-intensive technologies and companies – and find 
alternative investments. 
• The technology of renewable energy is becoming available 
at a scale to replace fossil fuels, and the market is starting to 
invest in this area. 
• Organisations such as churches, unions, cities and uni-
versities are already divesting their holdings in banks and 
superannuation funds that invest in fossil fuels. 
• These same organisations and individuals can ensure their 
investments are directed to transformational financial insti-
tutions and to re-engineering the energy economy towards 
more sustainable solutions.
• Communities from both sides of the political centre are 
beginning to campaign against the expansion of new fossil 
fuel projects, in Australia and around the world. For exam-
ple, there are alliances emerging between environmentalists 
and farmers campaigning against coal-seam gas. 
• Innovations and investment in sustainable technologies will 
enable developing countries to “leap frog” towards indus-
trial and social development that is not dependent on fossil 
fuels.
• Individuals and families also contribute to the new economy 
by reducing their consumption of fossil fuels and adopting 
alternative energies in the form of household solar and 
community wind farms. Other personal actions include 
33
REFRAMING EQUITY FOR ACTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
embracing public transport, and reducing food waste and 
food miles. 
Finally, while we cannot currently rely on political leadership 
and international diplomacy to solve the problems of climate 
change, we cannot give up on them. We must hold governments 
accountable for their unhealthy relationships with the fossil fuel 
industry, and ensure they fulfil their responsibility to achieve 
a global agreement on climate change. In the end, all of these 
actions combined, even if taken in the name of self-interest, will 
contribute to securing our own future, as well as that of our fel-
low humans in the most vulnerable parts of the world. 
Unlike other civilisations that have collapsed in the past, we 
have several things in our favour. We know that climate change 
is happening and we understand why. We also have the scien-
tific and economic capacity to decarbonise and retool our world 
for a more sustainable future. This global shift can be achieved 
both through the brilliance of human innovation and through 
informed and committed endeavour. We have access to solutions 
that provide “shared value” for people and for companies with a 
positive environmental impact, that decarbonise the old and new 
economies, that lift people out of poverty, and that eradicate the 
energy systems of the nineteenth century. This transformation 
also requires us to recognise and respond to the stalling actions 
of the fossil fuel industry. Humanity can face this challenge, and 
solve it, as long as we get on with the job.
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CHAPTER 3
Markets say the  
darnedest things
Oscar McLaren
A quarter of a century after the British conservative party  oversaw the privatisation of British Petroleum, a newly minted conservative prime minister was under pressure to 
lend the company a hand. On 20 April 2010, a blowout on BP’s 
 Deepwater Horizon oil rig started the largest accidental marine 
oil spill in human history, taking eleven lives immediately and 
the livelihoods of countless others over the following days, weeks 
and years.
Two months later, the world was still watching live  television 
images of oil gushing from the sea floor and a global outcry against 
BP was growing louder. Curiously, the chairman of the British 
insurance giant Royal Sun Alliance, John Napier, took this oppor-
tunity to write a petulant letter to US president Barack Obama. 
Napier accused Obama of being anti-British and unstatesmanlike:
Your comments towards BP and its CEO as reported here 
are coming across as somewhat prejudicial and personal… 
The leak may take time to fix, and it will be, but Afghanistan 
and Iraq will take much longer.1
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It was just one of many pieces of transatlantic trash talk against 
a US president dealing with an unprecedented environmental 
catastrophe. A few days later, British chancellor George Osborne 
relayed that the “prime minister is… clear that we need con-
structive solutions and that we remember the economic value BP 
brings to people in Britain and America.”2
As a Daily Mail editorial was keen to point out, eighteen mil-
lion Britons own shares in BP, either directly or through pen-
sion funds, and the company was to that point responsible for 
one-seventh of all dividends paid by British companies. The 
Daily Mail believed that prime minister David Cameron was not 
being tough enough in defending his nation’s most high-profile 
polluter, and was “seemingly more concerned about the ecology 
of the Gulf of Mexico than securing BP’s future.”3
It was a remarkable spat between two close allies. But 
 compared to the discussions that should have been happening, 
the narrative of an Anglo-American stoush offered an almost 
morale-boosting distraction from the broader issues raised by 
the Gulf of Mexico spill. It left unaddressed the question of what 
would have happened if a Chevron oil rig had spoiled the Gulf of 
Mexico, or if BP’s Deepwater Horizon rig had blown out in the 
North Sea, sending crude oil sweeping the beaches of the Eng-
lish east coast and ruining the cod and crustacean fisheries in 
its path. In short, the political disagreement showed how little 
serious thought is given to weighing the benefits of fossil fuels 
against their catastrophic consequences.
Of course, through its prodigious contribution to greenhouse 
gas emissions, BP is causing climate change, and through sea-
level rise and ocean acidification alone it is ruining the beaches 
of England and the fisheries of the North Sea. In the same way, 
Chevron is ruining the Gulf of Mexico and the industries on 
which millions of Americans depend. In this light, the Daily Mail 
was at least partly right – there is a zero-sum game between BP 
(and its fossil fuel stablemates) and the environment. 
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Fewer than one hundred companies stand responsible for 
nearly two-thirds of the global greenhouse gas emissions released 
into the atmosphere during the industrial age.4 But in Australia 
and many other countries in the West, the debate is not about 
whether we prefer the oil and coal industries or a functioning 
planet. Instead, after years of public-relations work by the world’s 
biggest polluters, the debate about climate change is framed as a 
choice between a functioning planet and a functioning economy 
as a whole. And in Australia when asked whether we would like 
an economy or the environment, we have voted overwhelmingly 
for the economy. But before we accept this as an answer we must 
check whether this absurd question is the right one to ask.
•
If you believed television advertisements in Britain in 1986, news 
of the privatisation of British Gas was taking the country by storm. 
One ad began in a pub with a man dressed in tweed and a prepos-
terous bow tie asking a younger “everyman” to pass on a secret tip 
to someone called Sid. In a hushed, slimy tone, the tweeded man 
says that buying British Gas shares couldn’t be easier.
We soon learn that stock tips and insider trading are for-
eign concepts to our everyman, who proceeds to tell everyone 
he bumps into. By the end of the ad, all his acquaintances, from 
the postman to a charming pensioner, are off to get some of the 
action for themselves. The message was clear – now everyone can 
access the sort of wealth usually reserved for people dressed in 
tweed – and it was a sweetly egalitarian gloss for a deeply strati-
fying policy.
The same narrative was trotted out repeatedly in Britain over 
the late 1970s and 1980s as Margaret Thatcher sold off everything 
from Jaguar to British Petroleum to British Telecom. In Australia, 
the story was told with particular enthusiasm during the Telstra 
privatisation – a big step along John Howard’s path towards  turning 
Australia into a “nation of shareholders.” But Thatcher and Howard 
were doing more than merely panning for votes in the gravel of 
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middle-class fear and loathing. The public float of Telstra shares 
was more than an invitation to buy a dud stock (nearly fifteen 
years on, T2 shares are still trading well below their issue price). 
It was a call to share in the very specific ideas that neoliberal eco-
nomics has about ownership, efficiency and value.
Margaret Thatcher told the 1987 conservative party con-
ference that “soon there will be more shareholders than trade 
unionists in this country. Of course, not all trade unionists are 
shareholders – yet. But I hope that before long they will be.”5 
It was a touching idea, but the “nation of shareholders” project 
is best seen not as a leg-up for trade unionists, but as an all-ages 
curriculum on the pleasures of capital. Among the first lessons 
were those in the great capitalist sport of externalising costs and 
internalising profits. The “nation of shareholders” plan encour-
aged the new “mum and dad investors” to view the announce-
ment of job cuts at big companies not as stories of upheaval and 
downward mobility for the families of those retrenched, but as 
efficiency measures that would thunder home as an extra few 
cents in the next dividend payment. It was an invitation to see a 
document titled “climate change and equity” and expect to read 
about a stock opportunity.
Whatever we now make of the success of the great privatisa-
tions, the political and ideological campaign was a blazing suc-
cess. The humble dollar now sits at the centre of a dizzying array 
of public policy discussions, especially those about the environ-
ment. While the global payday lender MasterCard assures us that 
some things are priceless, in the real world, truly priceless things 
like the Great Barrier Reef must earn their keep and are priced to 
the nearest hundred million dollars.6 
•
It was into this public consciousness that Nicholas Stern released 
his Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change in  October 
2006. It was not the first, or the most ambitious, effort yet to sur-
vey the costs of climate change, nor was it peer reviewed. But it 
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was, and is to this day, the highest-profile attempt to place an 
economic framework around climate change. Once released, it 
was quickly distilled to the simple calculus that the globe could 
stabilise atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations at 550 parts 
per million, or ppm, by 2050 at a cost of around 1 per cent of 
GDP per annum. The costs of doing nothing were put at between 
5 and 20 per cent. 
As peer reviews started to roll in, there were those who lent 
support to the paper, including four winners of the Nobel Prize 
for economics. Then there were those like environment econo-
mist Richard Tol, who said, “If a student of mine were to hand in 
this report as a Masters thesis, perhaps if I were in a good mood 
I would give him a ‘D’ for diligence; but more likely I would give 
him an ‘F’ for fail.”7
There were skirmishes over whether Stern had deliberately 
chosen extreme worst-case scenarios for his modelling of the 
costs of inaction, and whether he had underplayed the costs 
of cutting emissions. The grand debate, however, was over dis-
counting, or how to balance the scales between the interests of 
the current generation and the interests of those who will follow.
Economists frequently place less present value on things that 
will be obtained or occur in the future, but Stern took a very dif-
ferent approach. In the wake of the release of the Stern Review, he 
stated that the traditional approach of “discounting”
says that an individual who is born 30 years after another 
individual would, if you use a pure time discount rate of 
two per cent per annum, be given half the weight of the 
individual born earlier. Many people for a century or more 
have thought hard about the pros and cons of discounting 
the utility of future generations, and I still have not heard a 
convincing ethical argument for indulging in that kind of 
discrimination, particularly in the context of issues which 
affect the entire planet. We may know lots of people who 
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don’t care about the future, but that doesn’t mean this is the 
right ethical standard to apply for such an important issue, 
profoundly affecting the welfare of future generations.8
This position led Stern to impose a discount rate of 0.1 per cent 
– a tiny fraction of the rate commonly applied in the literature of 
climate change economics. The key criticism of Stern’s approach 
was that it takes no account of future economic growth that will, 
it is argued, leave later generations better off and therefore in a 
better position to take action against climate change and deal 
with its consequences.
In the words of William Nordhaus, a veteran of climate 
change economics, orthodox discounting models involve min-
imal emissions cuts at first: “The efficient strategy has more 
investment in conventional [read: polluting] capital at the begin-
ning and can use those additional resources to invest heavily in 
climate capital later on.”9 In other words, if future generations 
ask their grandparents why they didn’t do more about climate 
change, the grandparents will offer the grandchild ten ice creams 
and recall how they could only ever afford one.
The debate around discount rates raises some genuinely 
meaty ethical questions. But what is often missing is the  question 
of how long the current model of economic growth can con-
tinue in a world of finite natural resources and a rapidly chang-
ing  climate. At some point the “optimal” gradualist approach of 
Nordhaus and friends must intersect with climate science, and 
the question has to be asked: How much carbon will be released 
into the atmosphere under their approach? According to Mar-
tin Weitzman, another Stern critic, the answer is “>600 ppm… 
with temperatures expected to continue rising to well above [3°C 
above pre-industrial levels] after year 2105.”10
Yet the global scientific and political consensus is that in 
order to prevent dangerous, runaway climate change, global 
temperature rises must be limited to 2°C. Even the  Copenhagen 
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Accord of December 2009 – widely seen as a failure in the face 
of an urgent need for climate action – recognised 2°C as the 
upper limit of acceptable global warming.11 And, according to the 
International Energy Agency, or IEA, and a host of other author-
ities, the required atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide 
needed to achieve this limit is 450 ppm – less even than the 550 
ppm advocated by Stern. The difference between the standards 
accepted by the global community and the standards offered by 
economic orthodoxy are breathtaking, and offer a first glimpse 
into the problems with the way the economy and the environ-
ment intersect.
The issue lies partly in the fact that even the most advanced 
economic modelling has difficulty determining what to do with 
massive, existential risks such as rapid melting of the polar or 
Greenland ice sheets, or combustion of the Amazon. This is a 
point that is acknowledged by many critics of the Stern Review. It 
has been commonplace for some time to note that climate change 
is not linear and it is difficult to predict the circumstances under 
which tipping points may be reached, beyond which the effects of 
climate change simply cannot be managed. While a computer run-
ning a consumption-smoothing analysis may say that more than 
600 ppm of carbon dioxide concentration will be the result of an 
optimal emissions reduction strategy, those familiar with climate 
science have already decided that the risks of this are far too high. 
•
If the tools and brains available to academic economists find it 
hard to agree on an easy path to a sensible climate, there must 
be little hope for those who are actually in charge of the global 
economy. Whereas the discipline of economics, when practised 
well, acknowledges the frailties of its methods and the vagaries 
of operating at the intersection of science, society and capital, 
global markets are not quite so circumspect. Bitter experience 
has taught us that in today’s economy the allocation of capital 
is, like rugby league, a game of genius played by morons. And 
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so it should be no surprise that while humans have been fretting 
about how to approach climate change, global capital markets 
have taken a more bacchanalian approach. 
Predictions of climate change are often fraught, but the 
 science of how to remain below 2°C of warming since pre- 
industrial levels is reasonably settled. The IEA puts the “carbon 
budget” – that is, the amount of carbon dioxide that can be emit-
ted into the atmosphere in order to remain below 2°C of warm-
ing – at 884 billion tonnes by 2050.12 Meeting this budget will 
require that, in the words of the IEA, “more than two-thirds of 
current proven fossil-fuel reserves” be left in the ground.13
The implications of this for global energy markets and the 
valuation of some of the largest companies on the planet are 
staggering. And this makes it all the more perplexing that a 2013 
London School of Economics study found that up to US$674 bil-
lion had been spent in the previous year on finding new fossil 
fuel reserves and developing increasingly adventurous ways of 
extracting them.14
It is not just those fond of hemp clothing and organic rubber 
sandals who are warning of the risk to valuations of fossil fuel 
companies. In January 2013, HSBC issued a report on the impli-
cations for fossil fuel companies of effective curbs on the globe’s 
carbon emissions. HSBC found that an effective curb would 
indeed render huge quantities of fossil fuel reserves unburnable, 
and would also lower demand and therefore the price that can be 
charged for fossil fuels. HSBC stated that the combined negative 
effect of these changes “would be equivalent to 40–60% of the 
market capitalisation of affected companies.”15 The report con-
tinues: “we believe that investors have yet to price in such a risk, 
perhaps because it seems so long term.”16
So what are we to make of this? The options are either that 
the market believes the chances of warming being limited to 2°C 
are close to non-existent, or that the market has gone off-piste. 
A  balanced view suggests the answer lies somewhere between the 
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two. At the most recent COP19 meeting of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, little progress was 
made, and the executive secretary, Christiana Figueres,  conceded 
that the outcome “does not put us on track for a two degree 
world.”17 But it is also inconceivable that business as usual will be 
allowed to continue, and it may not be governmental action that 
will put a cap on the burning of fossil fuels, but the simple fact that 
renewable energy is fast becoming competitive with fossil fuels.
In Australia the purchase of household solar panels will pay 
for itself in generated electricity in as little as four years,18 after 
which energy generation is free. On a far humbler scale, at village 
level throughout parts of East Africa, a popular and concrete step 
towards poverty reduction is the sale of small solar panels to fam-
ilies to power lights and mobile phones. The price of the units, 
which is paid over a matter of months, is less than the equivalent 
cost of kerosene, the fossil fuel source of light that has been used 
for decades at great monetary and human cost.19 
Over the past decade much of the developing world has 
rapidly obtained access to telecommunications through mobile 
phones, without going through the expensive and capital- 
intensive step of a large-scale landline copper network. Access 
to energy is increasingly spreading in the same way, with small-
scale local grids being incrementally rolled out instead of the 
heavy networks that brought electricity to the global north last 
century. Equally, in the advanced and heavily industrialised 
economy of Germany the ambitious Energiewende policy is seek-
ing to cut emissions by 40 per cent from 1990 levels by 2020, 
while incrementally removing nuclear energy from the mix. 
Renewable energy uptake is being driven by small-scale and 
often  community-owned plants, which are growing faster than 
the country’s big four generators.20 
•
There are many sources of heartbreak along the path of climate 
change. There is the fact that while it will affect nearly everyone 
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on the globe, it is those in the poorest regions who will suffer 
most, from increased hurricanes and cyclones in coastal areas, 
longer monsoons, and the growth of tropical and especially mos-
quito-borne diseases that these changes will bring. There is the 
fact that dry areas of the globe will become drier, in the process 
making tens of millions of people vulnerable in sub- Saharan and 
East Africa alone. There is the fact that within developed coun-
tries like Australia, the costs of adapting to climate change will 
be harder to meet for those from lower socioeconomic back-
grounds. And there is the fact that future generations will bear 
the costs of current generations’ failures.
It could be of some comfort if the economic system and the 
stories that the developed world has told itself held some weight. 
If by accepting the criticism of the Stern Review’s call for urgent 
action we would in fact leave later generations better-off after the 
magic of economic growth. If heavy support for fossil fuel explo-
ration and development now was going to repay handsomely in 
the future. If the only path to development for the global south 
is the one already trampled by the global north. But as we have 
seen, none of this is true.
The fossil fuel executives, bankers and free marketeers who 
got the globe into this mess won’t be the ones who will pay. As 
we heard during the time of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, 
the people who stood to lose from BP’s being properly held to 
account were eighteen million Britons. Australians face the same 
problem: compulsory superannuation has seen the growth of 
a capital pool of $1.7 trillion, a disturbingly high amount of it 
invested in the fossil-laden Australian stock exchange.
The problem with the lessons of neoliberal economics is that 
its brand of capitalism simply cannot work for everyone. It relies 
too heavily on the ability to externalise costs – to poison the Gulf 
of Mexico then settle in for a cup of tea in Kensington. But there 
is nowhere for anyone to hide from climate change, and as we are 
forced to shelter from its increasingly severe and frequent effects, 
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counting piles of money is one distraction we won’t be able to 
rely on.
Author
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CHAPTER 4
Global warming: 
we cannot afford to fail
Dora Marinova and Peter Boyer
Creating dichotomies and putting things into boxes comes naturally to human beings. If we aren’t doing it with real objects we’re applying it to people and their ideas, aspirations 
and activities. It is a kind of ordering process  familiar to philoso-
phers, historians, sociologists, psychologists and other scientists 
– all those who have studied the human condition down the ages. 
Without it we would not have been able to form a picture of what 
and where we have been and what we are today.
The boxes into which we placed human identities and 
 activities of the twentieth century are familiar to all whose lives 
and thinking were formed in that century. We had communists 
and capitalists, constitutionalists and anarchists, law-makers and 
law-breakers. There were the opposing Allied and Axis powers, 
the socialist East and the corporatist West, the rich North and the 
poor South. Everything was manageable because everything had 
a label, a place. Most importantly, for all these things there was a 
defined boundary; we knew where one ended and another began.
Then, towards the end of the century, the boundaries began 
to blur, and the boxes lost their shape. The collapse of the Soviet 
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Union broke down one central divide of the twentieth century, 
between communism and capitalism. Accompanying it was the 
rise of the global economy, in which transnational corporations 
were able to secure unprecedented economic power and political 
influence, such that even governments of developed countries 
found themselves forced into subordinate bargaining positions 
against these corporate giants.
There was, however, one boundary that remained obstinately 
in place: the boundary between rich and poor. After the secu-
rity blanket of Soviet socialism (such as it was) vanished over-
night and the power of the large multinational corporations went 
increasingly unchecked by representative governments, the gap 
between rich and poor people, both between nations and within 
them, grew steadily wider. The trend continued into the present 
century, and persists today. 
At the same time something new appeared on the scene that 
didn’t fit any of the boxes or labels. Global climate change had 
no defined boundary within the planetary system we call Earth; 
indeed, the only defined boundary was the planet itself. The world 
that celebrated the fall of socialism and the end of the Cold War 
found itself confronting a whole new threat, made much worse 
by growing economic inequity. It quickly became clear that those 
people and nations that would suffer most as a result of changing 
climate were the world’s poorest, those that could least afford to 
mitigate its impacts.
The predominant instinct of people when confronted with 
a new kind of problem whose causes seem counterintuitive is 
to deny the nature of the problem, or even its existence. Even 
 scientists had difficulty with global warming. They had calcu-
lated that humans could affect the planet’s climate since the late 
nineteenth century, but it took another sixty years for physicists 
to finally identify the process by which this could happen. More 
decades passed before climate scientists and weather observ-
ers finally convinced the broader scientific community that 
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 greenhouse warming caused by human carbon emissions had 
actually started.
In the quarter of a century that has passed since then, scien-
tists have confirmed a strong global warming trend over the past 
century for which they can find no precedent in instrument and 
proxy temperature records going back thousands of years; and 
they have identified with greater than 95 per cent certainty that 
human activities, mainly the burning of coal, oil and natural gas, 
are responsible for this warming. They have identified the ways 
in which human health and wellbeing, and civil society around 
the world will be damaged by unconstrained warming, and the 
things that we need to do to mitigate this damage.
We know what needs to be done. All we now have to do is 
implement these actions.
It is not so simple, however. For one thing, obstacles to pro-
gress are embedded deep within our human psyche. The English 
environmental thinker George Marshall noted the counterintui-
tive nature of climate science in terms of a failure of what he calls 
a “risk thermostat.”1 We readily respond to threat when it is visi-
ble and immediate, has happened before, has an obvious cause, is 
coming from outside, and will directly affect us. Climate change, 
as Marshall points out, is none of these: it’s invisible, unprece-
dented and drawn out; its causes are complex, we are all con-
tributing to it, and it has indirect impacts. So the risk thermostat 
doesn’t readily kick in.
A Norwegian study cited by Marshall found that denial of 
global warming was socially organised. To quote the report, 
denial “took place in response to social circumstances and was 
carried out through a process of social interaction.” In other 
words, people tacitly agreed to exclude climate change from their 
unwritten list of acceptable conversation topics. If certain annoy-
ing people are foolish enough at a dinner party to raise the topic 
of, say, the effect of air travel on the carbon budget, the reaction 
is invariably silence followed by a change of topic. So knowing or 
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not knowing emerged as “a political act” in which people used a 
series of interpretive narratives to deflect disturbing information 
and normalise a particular version of reality. We enter into social 
compacts, unwritten agreements about what we can publicly 
acknowledge and talk about.
Our beliefs are not founded on rational thought, but are 
socially constructed from components that are not necessar-
ily rational. A 2001 Swiss study found nine different strategies 
used to deny climate change: displaced commitment (I protect 
the environment in other ways); condemning the accuser (You 
have no right to challenge me); denying responsibility (I’m not 
the main cause of this problem); rejecting blame (I have done 
nothing wrong); ignorance (I didn’t know); powerlessness (I can’t 
make any difference); fabricated constraints (There are too many 
impediments); cynicism (Society is corrupt); and comfort (It’s 
too difficult to change my behaviour).2 
These storylines are repeated by others to become consoli-
dated in social norms. Much stronger than rationality in shaping 
these norms is what our peers believe, so the big climate chal-
lenges must deal not with the content of messages but with the 
shaping of peer beliefs.
We choose to distance ourselves from the issue of climate 
change. Because it’s so commonly couched as a global problem, 
we’re able to exclude it from issues close to us, such as our rates, 
or the neighbour’s dog, or the state of the roads. Because it’s per-
ceived as a slowly developing problem, we choose to put it out 
of our minds since it’s not going to affect us, only our children 
or grandchildren. Because it’s seen as a discrete public issue, 
we choose to compartmentalise it, so that while passionately 
advocating action on emissions, we take regular flying holidays. 
Vested interests, such as those of the livestock and pharma-
ceutical industries, are controlling the dissemination of crucial 
information that could improve the health of both people and 
the planet, and we continue to consume amounts of meat way 
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beyond the medically recommended levels.3 Encouraged by gov-
ernment and business to take small personal actions, we suc-
cumb to token offsetting behaviour (“I have a strict switching-off 
regime at home so therefore I can take that overseas holiday with 
a clear conscience”). 
Alternatively we can succumb to cynicism: “The world is 
going to end; we must enjoy it while we can.” This latter trend is 
emerging quite strongly among young, affluent consumers who, 
while understanding the veracity of the science, enjoy their life-
style too much to want it to be compromised in any way. Such 
cynicism can give rise to all sorts of seriously problematic behav-
iour, posing a still-small but growing threat to our social fabric.
Powerful campaigns against climate action have revealed 
governments’ vulnerability in addressing climate change. Gov-
ernments are a product of history and their people, but they 
are failing in the face of this challenge. This is partly because 
 inefficiency – a necessary part of democracy and good govern-
ment – is built into the system. The principal cause of the repeated 
setbacks, however, is the fact that the evidence for human- 
induced warming is highly susceptible to misinterpretation, so 
that people everywhere have been having difficulty working out 
what’s true and what isn’t.
•
We are in great need of scholarship that recognises and articu-
lates the new paradigm of human-induced climate change, and 
that analyses the underlying social, economic and political forces 
shaping our modern world and presenting obstacles to the shifts 
necessary to address this huge challenge effectively. Such a par-
adigm shift is offered in a powerful new analysis by Dr Delys 
Weston, whose book The Political Economy of Global Warming: 
The Terminal Crisis was published by Routledge in 2014 after her 
untimely death in December 2012.
If there was a thread that tied together Del Weston’s event-
ful life – a constant, underlying characteristic in her words and 
54
GAVIN MOONEY MEMORIAL ESSAYS 2013
deeds – it was a passionate and unyielding commitment to 
social justice and equity. This was no intellectual construct, as 
it is sometimes observed in people; nor was it something to be 
kept to one side, to be taken up on odd occasions when disaster 
strikes. It lay at the core of Weston’s being, a primary determi-
nant of her thinking, her writing and her personal life. It was 
expressed not as a negative emotion but as an affirmation of all 
that is good in the human condition. 
In a world where the preoccupation with economic growth, 
job creation, interest rates and national deficits seems to set the 
political and social agenda, Weston dreamed of community gar-
dens and producers coming together to secure the most essential 
human right to food. In fact, she established a community garden 
in East Fremantle, Western Australia and then moved to Tasma-
nia where she started to grow her own food. 
Everybody who was fortunate to meet Del Weston or have her 
friendship keeps memories of a true and compassionate soul. Her 
presence evoked the gentleness and strength of an inspirational 
leader. She was a passionate scholar, an advocate for justice with 
a strong value-committed position, and a practical contributor 
to change on the ground – rare characteristics in today’s world.
All these qualities manifested themselves in Weston’s passion 
for South Africa and the African continent, considered to be the 
cradle of human life on Earth and now subjugated by colonial-
ism, imperialism and ecological debt. Her book is an outstanding 
political economy analysis which offers remarkable insights into a 
country and continent where global warming is expected to cause 
500 times greater loss to healthy life years than in Europe.4 South 
Africa’s poorest people are already the first- and worst- affected 
by climate change and its manifestations, such as droughts, heat-
waves, floods, storms and other extreme weather events. 
The adverse impacts of global warming will continue to 
threaten food security and poverty reduction on the African con-
tinent, where global climate change’s worst effects will be felt by 
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people least responsible for it and least empowered to deal with 
these effects. Using Marxist analysis Weston insightfully placed 
the discussion about the causes and consequences of climate and 
environmental change firmly within a transnational and global 
context concerning both Earth’s peoples and Earth itself – the 
colliding worlds of, on the one hand, political and economic 
power and, on the other, truth and justice. 
Although Weston was not pursuing an academic career, her 
PhD studies and book were a work of love, a personal commit-
ment. They were underpinned by her strong sense of justice and 
desire to expose the truth about the forces at play in today’s cap-
italist world, in order to justify the need for effective action. The 
science of climate change is still being disputed in Australia and 
other countries with a long history of exploiting fossil  carbon to 
their advantage, simply because people and organisations do not 
easily relinquish power, even when it is known that not doing so 
will bring truly dire consequences. Weston warned that climate 
change could become a new source of profits through the finan-
cialisation of carbon and the opening of the road to ecological 
imperialism. To counteract this scenario, she looked for wisdom 
and encouragement from the epistemologies, worldviews and val-
ues of Indigenous cultures that see nature as precious and divine.
Faced with the two options of ecological destruction or sys-
temic transformative change, Weston gave us what she called a 
“constitution” for a future society, around the principles of: meta-
bolic restoration of the environment; re-establishment of the 
commons, including clean air, water, sea, rivers, forests and land; 
food security for all people; a community of producers instead 
of a capitalist mode of production; contracted no-growth econ-
omies; equity and redistribution of the ecological debt; and par-
ticipatory democracy as a form of governance where ordinary 
people have the right to direct input into any decision-making. 
Noel Nannup, the eloquent champion of Australia’s origi-
nal peoples, wrote in the foreword for Weston’s book to never 
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underestimate the power of the spirit. We can achieve remarkable 
things when the challenge facing us becomes clear to all, when 
people everywhere see what science has been saying: that today’s 
greenhouse threat exceeds anything we know from geological 
time, that our present emissions trajectory amounts to a global 
emergency dwarfing our financial difficulties, and that our only 
recourse is to act as one. 
There is no other way for that to happen but to keep the dis-
course flowing whatever the reaction; to speak out for science 
against those who would have it trashed; to engage with others to 
take up the fight for a better, more resilient and, above all, more 
equal civil society; and never to give up. 
There is one dichotomy that humans cannot escape – that of 
life and death. Despite the death of each individual being una-
voidable, we grieve when it happens, irrespective of the circum-
stances. The existential threats posed by global warming to life 
on Earth, however, are not part of any intellectual exercise of 
ordering, putting things into boxes or explaining human reality. 
They are real physical consequences of the political economy of 
capitalism, which allows unchecked consumerism, an excess of 
power and wealth, deep social inequalities, and a metabolic rift 
between humans and the natural world. These are the symptoms 
of the terminal crisis of a system that favours the selected few 
and disregards the basic needs of, as Weston wrote, the “billions 
of current and future generations of people who share a finite 
planet, enveloped and interconnected through a thin layer of 
fragile biosphere – our global commons.”5
Del Weston left us to continue the challenging task of restor-
ing the metabolic function of the natural environment and heal-
ing the natural and human world. Her passion and strong belief 
in equity and the power of community to create new political, 
resilient, diverse and sustainable societies are an inspirational gift 
to us, radiating hope and optimism for a better, just reality for all 
species on Earth. “We cannot afford not to try, nor to fail.”6
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CHAPTER 5
It’s the ethics, stupid!  
Why climate action needs a 
new moral basis
Fergus Green
On Wednesday 13 November 2013, newly elected Australian prime minister Tony Abbott strode into the House of Repre-sentatives and proclaimed, with more than a little schaden-
freude, the death of Australia’s “toxic tax.” He was referring, of 
course, to the bill being introduced by his government to repeal 
the carbon pricing scheme – a signature achievement of the Gil-
lard Labor government, which has been operating since 1 July 
2012. Abbott’s parliamentary proclamation set the wheels in 
motion for the forty-fourth parliament to kill off a law whose six-
year conception, birth and life has been so politically destructive 
that it has laid waste to two prime ministers (one of them, twice) 
and one opposition leader.1 
The idea of pricing carbon wasn’t always so unpopular. 
Kevin Rudd the first was elected, in part, on a wave of popular 
enthusiasm for action on global warming. “Climate change,” he 
infamously stated, was “the greatest moral challenge of our gen-
eration.” And the people seemed to stir. The idea that one of the 
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world’s richest, most emissions-intensive countries should, in 
an age of climate risk, use the power of the market to curb its 
ever-growing greenhouse gas emissions seemed like a reasonable 
one. Internationally, Australia was lauded for its market-oriented 
climate leadership. 
So what happened? How did such an apparently exemplary 
reform become such a liability in such a short time?
A conventional account of the rise and fall of Australian car-
bon policy points to economic conditions: the 2008 global finan-
cial crisis refocused the public’s attention on more immediate, 
material concerns and undermined support for such “environ-
mental” taxation. To borrow Bill Clinton’s famous quip, it is, on 
this logic, “the economy, stupid.”
Other accounts focus on the politics. The spectacular fail-
ure of the Copenhagen climate conference in 2009 left many 
 Australians questioning why they should pay to cut emissions 
when they perceived (rightly or wrongly) that other countries 
were not. The Rudd cabinet’s post-Copenhagen decision to 
dump the carbon scheme, the subsequent internal party fallout, 
the deposing of Rudd himself, the making and breaking of Julia 
Gillard’s “no carbon tax” promise, and Tony Abbott’s virulent 
opposition also, on this account, explain the emergent hostility. 
“It’s the politics, stupid.”
Undoubtedly, the political explanation gets us closer to the 
mark. But it raises deeper questions: why did Kevin Rudd hitch 
his climate action wagon to Copenhagen? There was a well- 
documented risk that the Copenhagen negotiations would fail to 
meet expectations, and it was obvious that domestic opposition 
to carbon trading would be considerable in Australia’s fossil -
fuelled political economy. Why did he opt for an emissions trad-
ing scheme in the first place? Was there a better way?
•
Australia’s carbon woes are a microcosm of a deeper problem 
with the mainstream intellectual framework – or “paradigm” – 
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that has dominated the policy response to climate change for two 
decades. That paradigm is characterised by a belief that the best 
response to climate change involves the agreement, by all of the 
world’s 195-odd nations, of a “legally binding” treaty that spec-
ifies a long-term, collective emissions reduction goal and man-
dates emissions reduction targets for each country that “add up” 
to that goal, underpinned by an international market for trading 
emissions allowances (enabling emissions to be cut at the lowest 
possible total cost). I have called this paradigm “Treaties, Targets 
and Trading,” or TTT.
At the heart of TTT lie two assumptions about ethics. The 
first is a methodological assumption about the way that real-
world actions should relate to ideal ethical goals. TTT assumes 
that ethics should proceed by first working out what the ideal 
goal should be, then determining the ideal means – the princi-
ples, institutions and policies – for reaching that goal. The real-
world actions that should be taken, on this view, are the ideal 
ones. Call this the ideal-maximal approach to practical ethics.
The second assumption concerns the moral values that 
should inform what those ideal ends and means should be, 
namely international justice and, most relevantly for this essay, 
liberal welfarism. Under TTT, international justice arises in 
the context of distributing global emissions allowances among 
nations. The general position is that developed countries have 
greater, and more urgent, obligations to reduce emissions than 
developing ones. Welfarism is a theory of moral value according 
to which there is only one irreducible moral good in the world, 
namely the welfare of individual persons. Welfare, in this con-
text, is typically defined as the satisfaction of a person’s subjective 
preferences. In other words, we can measure what is ultimately 
good in the world by the extent to which the preferences peo-
ple happen to have are satisfied. What makes this theory of value 
a liberal one is the connotation that policy-makers should not 
seek to influence people’s preferences. Liberal welfarism, as we 
62
GAVIN MOONEY MEMORIAL ESSAYS 2013
shall see, informs the TTT paradigm of climate policy in multiple 
ways, but is especially relevant to the “trading” component. 
These twin ethical assumptions are, I shall argue, deeply 
flawed. It is these flaws that provide a third, deeper explanation 
of why the policy prescriptions of TTT have failed at the interna-
tional level and in countries like Australia.
Kevin Rudd was right about climate change being the great-
est moral challenge of our generation. But the moral response he 
prescribed was sorely defective. 
It’s the ethics, stupid.
•
The ideal-maximal approach to practical ethics has a long pedi-
gree – spanning Kant, Bentham and, in more recent times, Rawls 
and his intellectual disciples. It requires us to reflect on what we 
ought to do in a perfect world and, in particular, on the political 
institutions and relations that would constitute such a world. It 
has much less to say about what we should do now to achieve 
such a world. Rawls, for example, devotes only a few pages of his 
most celebrated work, A Theory of Justice, to the latter question, 
which is the subject of what he calls “non-ideal theory.” Many 
philosophers are trying to plug this gap, both at the theoretical 
level and in the application of philosophy to a wide range of prac-
tical issues.
Ethicists who study climate change, however, have had rela-
tively little to say about non-ideal theory. Thousands of pages of 
academic articles have been written about the moral principles 
that should govern the distribution of global emissions allow-
ances, and about the theoretical virtues of emissions trading. But 
few have considered whether these elegant ideals provide appro-
priate guidance to the mere mortals who inhabit the messy, com-
plex and thoroughly non-ideal real world. 
This is striking because, in the absence of a global “central 
planner,” or “sovereign,” TTT seems totally implausible. Using 
emissions trading to achieve a set of emissions reduction  targets 
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that are ethically distributed and that “add up” to a 2°C temperature 
goal would, surely, only be achievable if citizens,  policy-makers 
and companies everywhere were disposed to act cooperatively 
in the long-term, global public interest. For this to occur, eco-
nomic prosperity would surely need to be more evenly spread, and 
 political-economic power structures radically more equal, so that 
powerful vested interests could not overwhelm  policy-making and 
public opinion. Manifestly, these conditions do not prevail today. 
Proponents of TTT, aware of this inconvenient truth, none-
theless insist that the best approach is to just push through; to 
try to approximate the ideal prescriptions as best as can be done 
in real-world circumstances. Find yourself with a global collec-
tive action problem? Negotiate a comprehensive treaty that deals 
with all aspects of climate change, in one go, as best you can! Need 
to divide the load among countries? Negotiate targets as closely 
as possible in accordance with principles of international justice! 
Want to reduce your domestic emissions? Run that “textbook” 
emissions trading scheme through the gauntlet of vested interests 
and implement whatever comes out the other end!
This approach is flawed in theory and has been disastrous in 
practice. Theoretically, it violates Lipsey and Lancaster’s “General 
Theory of Second Best”: when any one condition necessary for 
an ideal solution does not hold, it cannot be assumed that the 
second-best solution involves the closest possible approximation 
of the ideal solution.2 To illustrate, consider a different example. 
One might hold to the cosmopolitan liberal principle that, in an 
ideal world, there would be no national borders regulating free-
dom of movement. But it would be unwise for a cosmopolitan -
minded government to try to abolish all its immigration controls 
tomorrow. Given public attitudes to immigration in most coun-
tries today, the social backlash would be overwhelming and the 
government would probably be turfed out. It would probably set 
back the migration liberalisation agenda many years, or at the 
very least fail to advance it in the most effective way. 
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As a methodology for addressing complex moral problems, 
unleashing TTT onto an unprepared world is the climate change 
equivalent of opening the borders tomorrow. 
Let us look more closely at how things panned out in  practice.
The Kyoto Protocol, agreed after tortuous negotiations in 
1997, committed developed and post-Soviet countries to reduc-
ing their emissions, on average, by 5 per cent below 1990 levels 
by the end of 2012. The government officials who negotiated the 
Protocol were then, as now, concerned largely to promote their 
respective nations’ short-term economic growth and industrial 
competitiveness, while appearing to be part of a global climate 
solution. Accordingly, each developed country negotiated emis-
sions targets, baseline years, accounting rules and measurement 
assumptions that were highly favourable to its own interests. 
Since the Protocol did not require the targets to be met until far 
into the future (the end of 2012), governments knew they would 
not be held accountable for their decisions. 
On paper, emissions among the countries with quantified 
targets ended up, as a whole, lower than the targeted reductions. 
But scratch beneath the surface and the picture that emerges is 
more disturbing. The emissions reductions were measured rel-
ative to emissions in 1990. This “base year” was chosen delib-
erately so that the emissions reduction task would be extremely 
easy. The post-1990 collapse of communism in the former Soviet 
countries resulted in a precipitous decline in industrial output, 
and hence greenhouse gas emissions, ensuring that these “econo-
mies in transition” met their targets easily and had vast surpluses 
of emissions allowances that they could sell, via the international 
emissions trading mechanism contained in the Protocol, to 
developed countries that fell short of their targets. (These allow-
ances are often referred to as “hot air” because they do not repre-
sent genuine, policy-induced emissions reductions.) 
Developed countries also had an easy ride. Australia was able 
to negotiate a clever carbon accounting loophole that allowed it 
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to meet its target (of an 8 per cent increase on its 1990 level emis-
sions) by implementing policies to reduce deforestation, despite 
its energy emissions growing more than 45 per cent since 1990. 
Japan struggled to meet its Kyoto target and so relied on inter-
national purchases of hot-air credits to offset the shortfall, and 
now projects that its emissions will grow by 3.3 per cent above 
1990 levels by 2020. Canada, whose emissions were, at the end 
of 2011, more than 18 per cent higher than 1990 levels and still 
growing, flagrantly ignored its obligations under the Protocol 
and opted out altogether in 2011. The United States, having been 
instrumental in weakening the content of the Protocol during the 
negotiations, never ratified it at all. The European Union at least 
implemented an emissions trading scheme and other mitigation 
policies, which had a modest impact on EU emissions, though its 
efforts to reduce emissions were helped along considerably by the 
post-1990 restructuring of its eastern member states, and by the 
global financial crisis and subsequent recession in the eurozone.
Over the same period, massive growth in the emissions of 
major developing countries like China and India has pushed 
global greenhouse gas emissions up 50 per cent since 1990 (these 
countries did not have Kyoto targets, consistent with the  principle 
of international justice, reflected in the Protocol, by which devel-
oped countries have greater responsibilities to reduce emissions). 
The failure of leadership by developed countries, evidenced 
in the outcomes of Kyoto, has led to a high-stakes game of 
“chicken” in the current negotiations on a successor treaty. The 
developing countries insist the rich world still needs to fulfil the 
spirit of its Kyoto commitments and lead with deeper emissions 
cuts. Meanwhile, developed countries are reluctant to commit 
to further cuts without reciprocal cuts by the emerging giants – 
 particularly China and India – who will produce the lion’s share of 
future emissions. As it stands, a number of countries have made 
some pledges to reduce emissions, but most of these are unambi-
tious, highly conditional and not implemented through domestic 
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 legislation. Collectively, they come nowhere near to “adding up” 
to an ethically defensible emissions trajectory, especially when 
lax accounting assumptions and loopholes are factored in. 
A similar ill fate has befallen the few emissions trading 
schemes that countries have tried to implement. The Kyoto Pro-
tocol’s Clean Development Mechanism – which allowed devel-
oped countries to gain credits towards their Kyoto targets by 
investing in emissions reduction projects in developing countries 
without their own targets – has been racked by successive scan-
dals, widely “gamed,” and deservedly criticised for weakening the 
pressure on developed countries to reduce their own emissions. 
All three phases of the European Union’s scheme have suffered 
from major design flaws, resulting in volatile, and now farcically 
low, carbon prices, which make no meaningful impact on busi-
ness decisions to cut emissions. The likely-soon-to-be-repealed 
Australian carbon pricing scheme is riddled with loopholes, 
carve-outs and design flaws that will prevent it from making 
much of an impact on the grossly emissions-intensive structure 
of Australia’s economy for the foreseeable future. 
Meanwhile, the exclusive focus on the domestically produced 
emissions under Australia’s scheme has given successive Austral-
ian governments a pretext to ignore the biggest loophole of all: 
our fossil fuel exports. Already, twice as much carbon dioxide is 
released from the burning of the coal and gas Australia exports as 
from the fossil fuels we burn at home. At a time of rapidly acceler-
ating climate change, coal and gas companies are progressing new 
mines, wells, railways, pipes and ports that, when fully operational, 
would more than double Australia’s exported emissions by 2030. 
Successive Australian governments have relied on the UN 
climate accounting framework – which requires countries only to 
count the emissions released within their borders – to wash their 
hands of moral and legal responsibility for the climate impacts of 
this reckless fossil fuel expansionism. In the ideal world of TTT, 
we could export these fuels in the knowledge that the  importing 
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countries were burning them within safe, binding emissions lim-
its. But in the real world, where no such limits exist, coal and 
gas companies and their servants in government are making hay, 
while global emissions soar. 
In the face of this shameful reality, the advocates of TTT have 
been left flat-footed. Many hope that these new fossil fuel assets 
will be “stranded” when the countries that currently import our 
coal decide to cut their fossil fuel imports for climate change or 
other reasons. While this is certainly a risk to which Australian 
policy-makers should be much more sensitive, there is little in 
the way of policy response that TTT-advocates can offer beyond 
a reaffirmation of the need for more and better TTT. 
There remains, in the worldview of TTT proponents, a Clive-
Palmer-and-Gina-Rinehart-sized blindspot. 
•
The second fundamental reason for the failure of TTT is that its 
liberal-welfarist foundations, most applicable to the emissions 
“trading” element of the paradigm, are too weak to support the 
weight of the task of decarbonising the global economy. 
A prominent criticism levelled at emissions trading is that 
it fails to express society’s moral disapproval of greenhouse gas 
pollution. For example, the philosopher Michael Sandel argues 
that when the state attaches a ban or a fine or a penalty to an 
activity, it registers society’s moral disapproval; but when the 
state distributes tradeable permits to pollute, it effectively con-
dones the activity. Sandel’s insight is an important one, but the 
connection between moral judgement and emissions trading 
is arguably slightly more nuanced than this. Because emissions 
trading schemes place a cap on pollution, which limits the avail-
ability of emissions permits, they do imply a moral judgement 
by society about the undesirability of greenhouse gas emissions. 
The problem, as I see it, is rather that this moral judgement is 
divorced from the moral character of the person, or the underly-
ing  activity, that produces those emissions. 
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To explain this a little further, it is helpful to understand that 
the vision of a good society implicit in liberal-welfarist climate 
policy is a maximally efficient one; one in which the “economic 
pie” – the economy’s capacity to satisfy people’s subjective pref-
erences, as measured by their “willingness to pay” for the things 
they prefer – is maximised. Emissions trading schemes maximise 
the economic pie by eliminating emissions in order of lowest to 
highest abatement cost: through trade in permits, those with the 
highest willingness to pay to pollute will get the permits, while 
others who are less willing to pay can sell their permits and use 
the money to satisfy their other preferences.
The problem is that the narrow focus on efficiency starves pro-
ponents of emissions trading of the conceptual resources needed to 
criticise, on moral grounds, particular activities that cause green-
house gas emissions, or particular people who carry out those 
activities. For if one thinks that the satisfaction of preferences is 
all that matters, morally speaking, then one can have no moral 
ground for criticising those preferences. On liberal- welfarist 
logic, the tonne of carbon dioxide released from the billionaire’s 
private jet is deemed to be morally equivalent to the tonne emit-
ted from the diesel power generator of a remote rural hospital. If 
the billionaire has a higher willingness to pay for the privilege, he 
gets to keep emitting longer than the hospital does. Of course, the 
hospital might be able to sell its emissions permit to the billion-
aire, and that transaction may benefit the hospital. But the point 
is that the legal mechanism society has adopted for responding to 
climate change has, in this case, ended up legitimising and pro-
longing behaviour that reveals a contemptuous attitude towards 
one’s fellow citizens and the natural world. 
While this example is, for pedagogical purposes, delib-
erately extreme, the problem it illustrates is not a hypothetical 
one: emissions trading schemes around the world have helped 
to strengthen and legitimise the people and corporations who 
most resist action on climate change. In the European Union, 
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 carbon-trading watchdog Sandbag found that many heavily 
polluting power generation and industrial (iron and steel, and 
cement) companies held hundreds of millions of euros’ worth of 
surplus allowances (emissions permits allocated to them for free 
but in excess of their emissions needs). The scheme thus strength-
ened the profitability of some of the most polluting industries 
who were at the same time attacking and lobbying against much-
needed reforms to an already extremely weak scheme. 
A similar dynamic is occurring in Australia. Accompany-
ing the introduction of Australia’s carbon pricing scheme, the 
Australian government lavished, on highly dubious grounds, 
$5.5  billion in cash and free permits on the country’s most 
highly polluting coal-fired power generators (to be paid between 
2011 and 2017). Additionally, around fifty so-called “emissions- 
intensive trade-exposed industries” are receiving billions in 
free permits every year. In the scheme’s first year of operation, 
2012–13, more than one hundred million fixed-price units were 
allocated freely to these companies, at a total value of more than 
$2.3 billion. Most of these companies lobbied heavily against the 
scheme and/or had a strong hand in weakening its provisions; 
and most are at no real risk of being placed at a competitive dis-
advantage against more carbon-intensive trade competitors.
But beyond these overt instances of “gaming” and “rent- 
seeking,” emissions trading schemes tend to work a more insidious 
harm by depoliticising and legitimising the most morally dubious 
companies and their activities. Research published earlier this 
year in the peer-reviewed journal Climatic Change found that 
just ninety companies – all fossil fuel and cement producers – are 
responsible for nearly two-thirds of all global emissions since the 
beginning of the industrial age.3 Many of these companies – prob-
ably the vast majority of them – have fiercely resisted attempts to 
impose climate policies in the jurisdictions where they operate, 
and many have funded the climate change denial movement. 
Where emissions trading schemes have been introduced, these 
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companies have heavily influenced their design, with predicta-
ble results. And once a carbon behemoth is part of the resulting 
trading schemes, it is subject to the depoliticised, willingness-to-
pay-based morality that treats it as just another legitimate market 
participant who buys and sells government-backed commodities 
within the constraints of an overall emissions cap. 
Of course, no climate policy can avoid entangling the big-
gest emitters, or resist their power entirely. The point is that their 
power itself must also be challenged if climate policy is to have 
a hope of succeeding. Emissions trading, given its power-blind 
moral structure, cannot perform that task. It is a task, moreover, 
that, with so much attention being focused on constructing and 
improving emissions trading schemes, we have tended to forget. 
We can thus see how liberal-welfarist values complement 
the ideal-maximal approach to ethics. Together, they form the 
power-blind moral foundations of TTT: if we lived in the ideal 
world where states could agree on, and enforce, a comprehensive 
regime of legally binding targets with a perfect global emissions 
trading scheme that reduced emissions to an ethically defensible 
level, then it might matter less that emissions trading schemes are 
silent on the moral character of different emitters. But in the real 
world of fossil fuel–funded climate change denialism, corrup-
tion, lobbying, misinformation and scare campaigns – the world 
where wealth, power and politics matter – these power-blind 
moral foundations are unfit for purpose. In this world, it is cru-
cial that we retain the moral concepts and rhetoric we need to 
identify the enemies in our midst, to expose them, to delegitimise 
them and, ultimately, to conquer them.
•
For this task, we need a new paradigm, based in a new ethic. This 
new ethic must comprise a plural set of values and must entail 
an alternative methodology for relating real-world means to the 
ideal ends of climate policy-making. We must build from these 
plural values a vision of the good society that encompasses, but 
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is not limited to, radical action on climate change, that inspires 
people to strive for it, and that provides us with the conceptual 
and rhetorical resources to criticise those who stand in its way.
Let us start with a new political goal: a world in which every-
one has the means to live a flourishing life – a life, as Amartya Sen 
puts it, that they have reason to value – within sustainable limits. 
A truly flourishing life consists in a plurality of goods, some of 
which are material, and many of which are social. Humans are, 
after all, complex pluralists: we care about fairness and fraternity, 
duty and dignity, security and stewardship, health, knowledge, 
and social esteem, to name but a few, and these goods cannot 
simply be reduced to “welfare.” The purpose of politics should be 
to secure to people the means to live a flourishing life consisting 
of at least a core set of the most important goods. This is not a 
new ideal vision – the general approach has its roots in ancient 
Greece and it has numerous proponents in contemporary Anglo- 
American philosophy, most prominently Martha Nussbaum – 
but it is fundamentally different from the current mainstream of 
liberal welfarism. (I cannot hope to give a fully specified account 
of this ideal here, but it will suffice for present purposes.)
Within this pluralistic vision, we need a more concrete goal on 
climate change to give partial meaning to the notion of “sustainable 
limits.” This goal should not, as in TTT, prescribe our immediate 
efforts, but rather should guide and motivate those efforts. Thus, 
the methodology for relating real-world efforts to ethical ideals 
should not be a matter of specifying policies and institutions for 
an ideal world and trying to shoehorn the real world into them. 
Rather we should define a goal that is general enough to admit of 
many possible means to its achievement, letting us choose those 
likely to be most effective in the light of real-world conditions. Let 
us call this the pragmatic-idealist approach to ethics.
Fifty years ago, President John F. Kennedy, in a commence-
ment address at the American University in Washington, DC, 
illustrated this method beautifully when he committed his nation 
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to the pursuit of peace through the elimination of nuclear weap-
ons. “By defining our goal more clearly,” he said, “by making it 
seem more manageable and less remote, we can help all peoples 
to see it, to draw hope from it, and to move irresistibly toward it.” 
Instructively, Kennedy realised that it would not be wise to 
try to reduce the world’s then 30,000-odd nuclear weapons in one 
fell swoop. His immediate focus was not on specifying the exact 
principles, institutions and policies by which the goal of elimi-
nating nuclear weapons should be reached (there was never any 
suggestion of a nuclear weapons cap-and-trade scheme, for exam-
ple). Rather, Kennedy realised that change would be non-linear, 
and would initially be incremental and slow. As such, near-term, 
pragmatic efforts to delegitimise nuclear weapons would be 
needed to change social norms, foster trust among the key play-
ers and build political momentum towards the ultimate goal. He 
chose, specifically, to begin this process with an  exhortation to 
ban atmospheric nuclear tests and a unilateral declaration that 
the United States would not conduct any such tests in the future. 
Applying this pragmatic idealism to climate change, we 
should adopt an aspirational goal of decarbonising the global 
economy by the middle of this century. That is, the nations of the 
world – and all its people and organisations – should aim to elim-
inate most anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions from every 
emissions-intensive economic and social process (and offset the 
remainder through the expansion of carbon sinks such as forests). 
This goal is neither so easy as to be uninspiring, nor so implausi-
ble that no one would bother to attempt it. Like JFK’s long-term 
goal of nuclear disarmament, moreover, it is morally compelling, 
psychologically salient, unambiguous and  inspirational. 
And just as JFK narrowed his immediate focus to banning 
nuclear weapons tests, we should start by aiming to  decarbonise 
the all-important energy sector, focusing predominantly on elec-
tricity generation and energy consumption in buildings, and sec-
ondarily on transport and industrial processes (though all should 
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be progressed simultaneously). Consistent with that intermediate 
goal, we must take urgent steps to accelerate the deployment of 
high-potential, clean energy technologies. But equally importantly, 
we must have a strategy to delegitimise fossil fuels, the companies 
that produce them, the billionaire barons who get rich from them, 
the governments that back them, and the social norms that facil-
itate their continued production and  consumption. Beginning 
with coal – the most highly polluting fuel source – we must come 
to see fossil fuels as taboo, just as we came to see nuclear weapons, 
ozone-depleting chemicals and asbestos in this way.
Our moral imaginations freed from the idealised policy pre-
scriptions of TTT and the bland reductionism of liberal-welfarist 
values, we can begin to see the manifold possibilities for advanc-
ing this delegitimisation agenda.
Governments, for one, have a wide range of tools at their dis-
posal. When big policy shifts – like Australia’s carbon and mining 
taxes, or comprehensive international treaties – prove impossible 
because of the power of vested interests, governments can, and 
realistically must, take a multi-pronged approach. For example, 
they should force companies to disclose to the public their green-
house gas emissions accounts, and to publish rigorous estimates 
of the full costs – particularly the health costs – of their activi-
ties; and they should force companies and financial institutions 
to disclose their investments in fossil fuel assets. Governments 
should remove the direct subsidies to fossil fuel and other emis-
sions-intensive sectors, which amount to roughly US$500 billion 
annually. And they should work with aligned groups within civil 
society to inform the public about the dangers of fossil fuels, 
through emotive and persuasive advertising of the kind that has 
been extremely successful in public health campaigns against 
smoking, drink- driving and asbestos. They can then build the 
political support for taxes, bans and eventually phase-outs of 
entire industries, and work with other countries to achieve the 
same outcome. 
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The politics of nuclear disarmament again provides an 
 analogy of more appropriate scale. Interestingly, Australia has 
a rich tradition of precisely the kind of pragmatic idealism in 
the nuclear field that President Kennedy pioneered. Australia 
is a non-nuclear middle power with little direct impact on 
nuclear weapons stockpiles. Yet, through a series of well-timed 
and well-resourced small and medium actions – including the 
establishment of nuclear-free zones, bans on nuclear testing, 
and “shaping the debate” through the promotion of high-level 
research – successive Australian governments for the last three 
decades have done an enormous amount to change global nuclear 
norms in the interests of peace and security. 
Sadly, on climate change, Australia’s two main political par-
ties are not well-intentioned custodians of the public interest 
fighting courageously amid challenging circumstances. Far from 
being disposed to delegitimise fossil fuels, they are the industry’s 
biggest promoters, differing only in the hues of the green facades 
they use to mask this shameful reality. 
In these circumstances, the action must come from below. 
Forward-thinking activists, businesspeople, researchers and local 
community groups must coalesce to change corporate and gov-
ernment behaviour and tip the balance away from fossil fuels. 
We must start by talking about fossil fuels as part of the problem, 
not the solution. To do this, we need to move beyond liberal wel-
farism and into a more “romantic” register that only a pluralist 
ethic permits – a rhetoric of bold visions (for the nation’s future), 
evocative storytelling (about the communities, places and liveli-
hoods to be safeguarded and improved) and the “friend/enemy 
distinction” (shaming the enemies of sustainable prosperity, and 
championing its pioneers). 
The savviest environmental activists and non-government 
organisations already get this. They have all but given up on the 
zombie-like UN negotiations, the idea that emissions trading is 
the best way to tackle climate change (at least in the near term), 
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the pretence that all emitters are morally equal, and the reduc-
tionism that treats climate change as morally isolated from other 
genuine social, economic and environmental concerns. They are, 
instead, doing their best to delegitimise fossil fuels and promote 
a clean energy revolution. 
American environmentalist Bill McKibben has squarely 
identified oil, coal and gas companies as public enemy number 
one, and built a rapidly growing movement to pressure investors 
to take their funds out of those companies, starting with univer-
sity endowments. Courageous activists are risking life, limb and 
extensive jail time in acts of civil disobedience to expose the out-
rageousness of Arctic oil drilling, rampant fracking for uncon-
ventional gas, and the bank-financing of mega-coalmines. Lock 
the Gate has mobilised local communities to fight coal-seam gas 
production in Queensland and New South Wales. Greenpeace, 
Friends of the Earth, the Sunrise Project and a platoon of local 
groups are highlighting the staggering climatic, environmental 
and community impacts of planned coal projects in those states. 
And groups like Beyond Zero Emissions and Repower Port 
Augusta are showing Australians what a zero-carbon economy 
can look like and why it would be so much better for their com-
munities than a fossilised one.4
People, it turns out, respond in droves to these ideas, to 
the plural moral values that motivate them, and to the nation- 
and community-building visions that enrich them. Just look 
at the breadth and depth of the social movement that has 
mobilised against coal-seam gas in places like the Darling 
Downs. And consider the extraordinary level of support for 
the idea of  building concentrating solar thermal power plants 
in Port Augusta: where else, in the fight for climate action, do 
you see local people, industry bodies, environmental groups, 
unions, local government, and even big energy companies all 
united behind a large-scale policy to finance revolutionary 
clean energy technology? 
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Indeed, it is only this localised “politics of place” that can 
engage and move people in the visceral way needed to enlist their 
support for deep change. And it is, as Ruth Davis of Greenpeace 
UK has argued, only through such a politics of place that we can 
ask ordinary people in countries like Australia and Britain to agi-
tate on behalf of the overseas victims of fossil fuel projects and of 
climate change itself.5 
This logic of popular, trans-community solidarity also implies 
a major shift in the ethics of distribution associated with climate 
change. We must move away from a preoccupation with inter-
national justice as it is understood in the TTT context – the fair 
“burden sharing” of emissions cuts per se between “developed” 
and “developing” countries – and towards a focus on the fair 
 distribution of the costs and benefits of the global energy tran-
sition between the richest people and companies and everyone 
else. The global financial crisis and its aftermath have exposed 
the reality that the greatest divisions in global society are not 
between “developed countries” and “developing countries” but 
between the super-rich 1 per cent and the 99 per cent, most of 
whom struggle, to varying degrees, with low or declining real 
incomes and austerity-driven cuts in public services. The poli-
tics of decarbonisation must thus create the conditions for cross- 
border social movements – not just among the victims of climate 
change and fossil fuel rapaciousness, but among everyone on the 
poorer side of the canyon of inequality that divides the richest 
from the rest. 
In practice, this means countries with strong incentives to 
innovate new technologies in particular sectors should cooperate 
with one another in proportion to their wealth and capabilities, 
and then spread the domestic costs progressively. This way, the 
countries with the most to gain from investing in new  technologies 
and processes, and the wealthiest people within those countries, 
pay the most, while the benefits redound globally. Australia, for 
example, should cooperate more with other sunny countries to 
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deploy, using smart policies, concentrating solar thermal power 
plants. Such deployment, done first in sunny, developed coun-
tries, would inevitably lead to production cost reductions, which 
would pave the way for countries like India, South Africa and 
China to deploy these technologies at prices competitive with 
fossil fuels. (German subsidies for solar PV have led to a two-
thirds decline in global PV prices in the past six years, benefiting 
people all over the world, not least the millions of Australians 
who added solar panels to their homes in the last four years.) 
Such actions would remove the economic sting of “emissions 
reduction burdens” that understandably deters some develop-
ing countries from making big, early moves on clean technology 
(of course, some are moving already, anyway). They would also, 
moreover, help compensate for increased fossil fuel prices result-
ing from the phase-out of fossil fuels that is necessary for energy 
sector decarbonisation.
•
The myopic mainstream focus on grand treaties, international 
emissions reduction targets and emissions trading schemes 
is  neither a necessary nor a wise approach to tackling climate 
change. These measures have had some marginal positive effects, 
but it is time to face up to the real and opportunity costs that 
have been incurred in the attempt to graft these theoretically ele-
gant, ideal solutions onto the messy, complex, unequal, non-ideal 
world in which we live. Paradoxically, TTT has strengthened the 
very non-ideal conditions – the fossil fuel–dominated corporate 
power structures, the political risk aversion, the public hostility 
towards climate action, and the weak levels of trust and confi-
dence in international institutions – that need to change if any 
ideal climate goal is to be achieved. All the while, precious time 
has been lost.
In the transition to a zero-carbon future, we will need 
 ethically significant, long-term goals to provide guidance and 
motivation for our present-day actions and policies. We will 
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need many forms of global cooperation to tackle climate change 
and other injustices fairly and effectively. And we will need some 
form of carbon pricing to incentivise structural change and the 
reallocation of private capital, and to raise government revenue 
for public investments in sustainable infrastructure and clean 
technology innovation. 
But we will need a lot more than these things, and we will 
need a new moral framework within which to pursue them. 
By constructing powerful, pluralistic visions for the future of 
our nations and communities, by championing clean solutions 
that make hope for a shared future possible while delegitimis-
ing the fossilised forces that imperil that future, and by building 
cross-border social movements as the basis for wide and deep 
political coalitions, we can successfully agitate for a cornucopia 
of effective, pragmatic public policies and private actions that 
advance us towards the guiding moral ideal of a flourishing, fair, 
decarbonised world.
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